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Abstract
This paper develops a trade model with ¯rm-speci¯c quality heterogeneity, limit pric-
ing, and an endogenous distribution of markups. Exposure to trade induces only the
¯rms producing high-quality (high-price) products to enter the export markets, whereas
¯rms producing low-quality (low-price) products serve the domestic market in accor-
dance to the Alchian and Allen (1964) conjecture. Trade liberalization intensi¯es the
competition; causes ¯rms producing low-quality products to exit the market; increases
the number of products consumed in each country; raises national and global welfare;
and generates quality upgrading that results in higher and average domestic and export
markups. Interestingly, the laissez-faire equilibrium is ine±cient, and this leaves room
for welfare-improving government intervention.
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Several empirical studies have documented the presence of substantial ¯rm heterogeneity in
narrowly de¯ned product categories.1 According to these studies, ¯rm heterogeneity takes
the form of productivity di®erences among establishments or quality di®erences among
narrowly de¯ned product categories. Relatively more productive ¯rms are larger, charge
lower prices and are more likely to export successfully. Firms producing higher-quality
products charge higher prices and are more likely to engage in exporting. Firms face large
sunk costs of exporting; there is a large turnover among establishments and reallocation of
resources within industries; and the degree of turnover is correlated with exporting activities.
These empirical ¯ndings have served as building blocks in the development of a growing
strand of theoretical literature that has highlighted the nexus between ¯rm heterogeneity
and international trade patterns. Melitz (2003) was the ¯rst to develop a tractable model
of monopolistic competition and ¯rm heterogeneity based on productivity di®erences that
took into account and generated predictions that are consistent with several aforementioned
stylized facts. The theoretical framework proposed by Melitz has been extended by other
studies to address the role of ¯rm heterogeneity in several areas of international economics
such as foreign direct investment, intersectoral trade °ows and the gravity equation.2 In
addition, several recent studies have analyzed the nexus between trade, growth, and ¯rm
heterogeneity.3 It would not be an exaggeration to state that we are witnessing the genesis
of a new theory of intraindustry trade in markets characterized by ¯rm heterogeneity.
The present paper contributes to the new theory by proposing a tractable model of
monopolistic competition and trade in markets with ¯rm-speci¯c quality heterogeneity.
1See Clerides et al. (1998), Bernard and Jensen (1999), Aw et al. (2000), Schott (2004), Hummels and
Skiba (2004), Hummels and Klenow (2005), Hallak (2006), and Kugler and Verhoogen (2008) among many
others. Tybout (2003) o®ers an excellent survey of the empirical literature on trade in the presence of
heterogeneous ¯rms.
2See Helpman (2006) for an insightful survey of the theoretical literature on trade with heterogeneous
¯rms.
3Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007), Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008), Unel (2008), and Haruyama and
Zhao (2008) introduce endogenous growth mechanisms in the Melitz model.
1The production structure of the model follows closely Melitz's (2003) seminal work. Firms
face uncertainty with respect to the future level of product quality when they engage in
R&D to discover new products. This uncertainty is modeled by an unrestricted distribution
of product quality levels. Production is characterized by constant marginal costs plus ¯xed
production costs. Similarly, exporting involves ¯xed foreign-market entry costs plus per
unit trade costs.
After a ¯rm learns the quality of its product, it faces a unitary-elastic demand curve
(which is derived from a Cobb-Douglas utility function) and a competitive fringe of potential
imitators that can produce a generic, low-quality version of its product.4 We assume that the
¯rm competes against the fringe in a Bertrand fashion. Thus, the pro¯t-maximizing strategy
for the high-quality ¯rm is to charge a limit price, which is proportional to the product
quality level, and to drive the competitive fringe out of the market. Consequently, ¯rms
producing higher-quality products charge higher prices and markups, enjoy higher pro¯ts,
and engage in exporting activities. In contrast, ¯rms producing lower-quality products
charge lower prices, earn lower pro¯ts, and serve only the domestic market.
Unlike the existing models with heterogeneous ¯rms, trade in the present model af-
fects the intensity of product market competition through the proliferation of varieties,
which reduces consumer expenditure per variety and the quantity demanded for each brand.
This income e®ect hurts ¯rms producing low-quality products more than ¯rms producing
high-quality products and generates a reallocation of resources from low-quality towards
high-quality goods. The trade-induced reallocation of resources puts upward pressure on
the real wage which reinforces the aforementioned income e®ect. Thus trade increases the
\cuto®" (zero-pro¯t) quality levels in the domestic and foreign markets and generates qual-
ity upgrading, more varieties available for consumption, and higher domestic and export
markups.
4Preferences are similar to those used routinely in quality-ladders growth models. Segerstrom et al.
(1990) and especially Grossman and Helpman (1991), among many others, provide more details on this type
of preference structure.
2The simultaneous presence of an income-based mechanism, variable markups, and vari-
able input prices (the real wage) within the same model is missing from the rest of the
literature. For instance, Melitz's (2003) model that relies on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
preferences generates endogenous input prices but exogenous markups; whereas Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) rely on quasi-linear preferences to generate endogenous markups, but their
model yields exogenous input prices and excludes by assumption the factor-market based
mechanism that transmits the e®ects of trade liberalization.
Having developed a highly-tractable model of quality-heterogeneity and limit-pricing
strategies, we analyze the e®ects of trade liberalization in a global economy consisting of
many structurally identical countries. Trade liberalization can take a variety of forms given
the rich structure of our model: a move from autarky to restricted trade, a reduction in
trade costs, a reduction in foreign-market entry costs, or an increase in the size of the
global economy measured by the number of trading partners. All these di®erent facets
of trade liberalization generate the same e®ects: an increase in the intensity of product
market competition captured by a reduction in expenditure per variety; a reallocation
of resources from low-quality to high-quality products which results in exit of ine±cient
¯rms; quality upgrading in the domestic and export markets; an increase in the number of
products available for consumption in each country; an increase in average markups; and
an improvement in national and global welfare.
The trade-induced rise in average markups does not mean that the intensity of com-
petition declines, as would be the case in models where a typical ¯rm faces variable price
demand elasticity which transmits the intensity of product market competition and low-
ers the markup (see Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). In the present model, the elasticity of
demand is equal to unity and each ¯rm charges a limit price proportional to its quality
level that yields a ¯rm-speci¯c constant markup. The trade-induced increase in average
markups is a bi-product of the quality upgrading caused by the proliferation of varieties
and the reduction in the quantity demanded for a typical variety. This novel aspect that
3relates quality upgrading and higher average markups is missing from the literature and
complements the approach proposed by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
Despite the positive welfare impact of trade liberalization, the laissez-faire equilibrium
is ine±cient. This welfare property can be traced to the di®erence between the socially
optimal and the market-equilibrium average markups. The social planner is interested
in the welfare of the average consumer which depends on the average quality and the
average consumer surplus, whereas the market is interested in the behavior of the marginal
consumer which depends on the product with marginal quality. This di®erence yields the
novel ¯nding that the laissez faire \cuto®" quality levels of ¯rms serving the domestic
or foreign markets are socially suboptimal. Therefore, the combination of Cobb-Douglas
preferences and limit-pricing strategies reveals the nature of welfare distortions and opens
the door for welfare-improving policies in markets with heterogeneous ¯rms. This welfare
feature is consistent with the generalized theory of distortions and welfare and the quality-
ladders growth theory. However, it is not present in models with Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
preferences and heterogeneous ¯rms. For instance, Feenstra and Kee (2008) use a multi-
sector version of Melitz's model to establish that the laissez faire \cuto®" productivity
levels of ¯rms producing either for the domestic of foreign markets are socially optimal.
This property allows them to estimate a well de¯ned GDP function using cross country
data, but it also means that there is no room for desirable government intervention.
Several features of our model enjoy empirical support. Each surviving ¯rm charges a
price which is proportional to its product quality level. This feature is consistent with
empirical studies that routinely use unit values to measure product quality (see, for in-
stance, Schott (2004), Hammels and Skiba (2004), Hummels and Klenow (2005), and Hallak
(2006)). The prediction that the quality (and price) of exports is higher than the quality
(and price) of products sold only in the domestic market provides a novel general-equilibrium
explanation of the Alchian and Allen (1964, 74-75) conjecture of \shipping the good ap-
ples out." This prediction is consistent with the ¯ndings of Hummels and Skiba (1994),
4Verhoogen (2008), and Baldwin and Harrigan (2007). Interestingly, models of productivity
heterogeneity are inconsistent with the evidence on export unit values because they predict
that more productive exporters charge lower prices than less productive non-exporters.5 Fi-
nally, the prediction that trade-liberalization generates higher average markups in markets
with vertical product di®erentiation raises a word of caution regarding empirical attempts
to analyze the e®ects of trade liberalization on markups. Our result together with the main
¯nding of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), that trade liberalization generates lower markups,
suggest that, without controlling for the nature of competition, one would expect to ¯nd
an ambiguous e®ect of trade liberalization on industry markups.6
Our paper is also related to a few studies that focus on ¯rm heterogeneity and industry
markups. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) develop a model of heterogeneous
¯rms, limit prices, and ¯rm-speci¯c Ricardian comparative advantage. Their model gener-
ates an exogenous distribution of markups and relies on an exogenous number of varieties.
In contrast, our model delivers an endogenous distribution of markups, an endogenous
number of varieties, and a di®erent resource-reallocation mechanism. As mentioned earlier,
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) develop a model of productivity heterogeneity, quasi-linear
preferences, and trade between two unequal-size countries. Their model generates endoge-
nous markups and addresses similar questions to those addressed in our paper. However,
in their model the wage is ¯xed by the presence of the outside good, production and ex-
porting do not involve ¯xed costs, markets are segmented, and it is not clear how quality
heterogeneity can be introduced without substantially complicating the analysis. Despite
these di®erences, both models predict that trade liberalization intensi¯es the product mar-
ket competition through variety proliferation in our model and through changes in the price
5See, for instance, Schott (2004, p. 676) who states that \unit-value patterns are inconsistent with new
trade theory models that have producer price varying inversely with producer productivity."
6The study by Harrison (1994) illustrates this point. Using plant-level data from Cote d'Ivoire, she
explores changes in productivity and markups following a 1985 trade liberalization episode. She ¯nds that
productivity increased, but price-cost markups fell only in few sectors and increased in others following the
reform. According to Harrison (1994, Table 5) markups, measured as pro¯ts over sales, increased in ¯ve out
of nine sectors and fell in the rest.
5elasticity of demand in theirs. Our ¯ndings, therefore, complement their analysis by reveal-
ing the positive e®ects of trade liberalization on markups in markets where ¯rms adopt
limit-price strategies and compete with each other in a Bertrand fashion. Finally, Baldwin
and Harrigan (2007) propose a model of quality heterogeneity based on Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) preferences where each ¯rm's marginal costs increase in the quality of the ¯rm's
product. Their model predicts that high-quality and high-price products will be exported,
as in our model, but delivers constant markups.
In summary, our paper makes three novel contributions to the literature on ¯rm hetero-
geneity and trade. First, it builds a simple model of quality-based ¯rm heterogeneity and
trade with limit-pricing strategies, variable markups, and a variable real wage. This allows
the study of the impact of trade that is transmitted through both the intensity of product-
market competition and the real wage. This general-equilibrium mechanism is missing from
other related studies. Second, the model o®ers several empirically relevant predictions on
the pattern and impact of trade in markets with quality-heterogeneous ¯rms. These predic-
tions are very similar to those of other models of trade with heterogeneous ¯rms with the
exception of the positive correlation between trade liberalization and average domestic and
export markups. Third, consistent with the generalized theory of distortions and welfare,
our model demonstrates the sub-optimality of the laissez faire equilibrium and opens the
door for welfare improving policies. This important welfare result is also missing from the
rest of the relevant literature.
Section 2 of the paper presents the basic elements of the model and the steady-state
equilibrium. Section 3 analyzes the impact of trade liberalization and the e®ects of a move
from autarky to trade. Section 4 describes the model's welfare properties, and Section 5
concludes.
62 The Model
In this section, we present the basic elements of the model regarding consumer preferences,
structure of production, and ¯rm entry decisions. We consider a global economy consisting
of n + 1 structurally identical countries with n > 1: Each economy has a single industry
populated by heterogeneous ¯rms, and labor is the only factor of production. In each
country, the aggregate supply of labor, L; is ¯xed and remains constant over time.
2.1 Consumer Preferences
Consumer preferences are identical across all countries and modeled by the following Cobb-
Douglas utility function de¯ned over a continuum of products indexed by !
U =
Z
!2­
ln
·
¯¸(!)
q(!)
L
¸
d!; (1)
where ¯ > 0 is a constant, ¸(!) denotes the time-invariant product quality, q(!) is the
aggregate consumption of brand !; and ­ is the set of varieties available for consumption
in a typical country. We focus our analysis on the case where each consumer buys all
available varieties, that is, we assume that the non-satiation principle holds. This case
arises if parameter ¯ is su±ciently high to ensure that the utility increases monotonically
in the mass of varieties consumed.7
Maximizing (1) subject to the budget constraint yields the standard Cobb-Douglas
demand for a typical variety
q(!) =
EL
p(!)Mc
; (2)
where E is per-capita consumer expenditure, L is the number of consumers in a typical
(home or foreign) market, p(!) is the corresponding price of brand !; and Mc is the measure
of ­ (i.e., the mass of varieties available for consumption). The market demand for a
7The condition ¯ > eL=fx, where e is the natural logarithm base and fx is the ¯xed foreign market
entry cost, guarantees the validity of the non-satiation principle. Section 2.4 provides more details on its
derivation. We would like to thank Tetsu Haruyama for pointing this out.
7product increases in aggregate consumer expenditure EL; and decreases in price p(!) and
the number of available products Mc:
2.2 Production
There is a continuum of ¯rms, each choosing to produce a di®erent product variety. Labor
is the only factor of production, with each worker supplying one unit of labor. Production
involves both ¯xed and variable costs: in order to produce q units of output, ` = fp + q
units of labor are required independently of the level of quality, where fp denotes the ¯xed
overhead cost of production measured in units of labor. Without any loss of generality, this
formulation assumes that the marginal cost of production is equal to the wage of labor.
Firms wishing to export must incur per-unit trade costs and ¯xed costs as in Melitz
(2003). Iceberg trade costs (such as transport costs and tari®s) are modeled in the standard
fashion: ¿ > 1 units of output must be produced at home in order for one unit to arrive at
its destination. In addition, exporting involves a ¯xed foreign-market-entry cost of Fx > 0
that does not depend on the ¯rm's quality level or the geographic location of production.
This cost covers the costs of setting a distribution system, collecting information about the
foreign market demand, product modi¯cations and adjustments to local tastes, and costs
based on regulations imposed by governments.8 The decision to export occurs after the
product's quality is revealed.
Each incumbent ¯rm faces a constant probability of death ± in each period. In the
present context, this stochastic shock can be interpreted as adverse changes in tastes that
eliminate the demand for a particular variety. Consequently, in the steady-state, each ¯rm is
indi®erent in principle between paying fx = ±Fx in each period and the one-time ¯xed cost
Fx in the ¯rst period of its existence. Hereafter, we assume that in each period exporters
face an overhead ¯xed cost fx in addition to the overhead production cost fp: Firms that
serve only the domestic market face just the overhead production cost fp:
8Existence of such market costs of exporting have been well documented by several studies (see, for
example, Bernard and Jensen (1999); and Tybout (2003)).
8Next, consider the optimal pricing decision of a ¯rm selling a brand of quality ¸ in its
home market. Because each brand is associated with a unique quality level, in what follows
we label products based on their quality levels. The aggregate quantity demanded is given
by equation (2), which implies that that expenditure per variety, p(¸)q(¸); is independent
of the brand's quality level. Because the elasticity of demand for each variety is unity, a
typical ¯rm has an incentive to charge an in¯nite price and produce an in¯nitesimally small
quantity independently of the product's quality level. To prevent this from happening and
to create an endogenous distribution of markups, we follow the spirit of Schumpeterian
growth theory and assume that once a product is introduced in a market (domestic or
foreign), a generic, lower-quality version of the product can be produced instantaneously
by a competitive fringe of ¯rms. The production of each generic product exhibits constant
returns to scale with one unit of labor producing one unit of output. We suppose that the
generic version of a product cannot be produced in a country unless the original product
is sold there. In other words, the technology to produce generics di®uses internationally
through imports.9 We normalize the quality level of each generic good to one independently
of the quality level of the copied product and the location of production.
Denote with pd(¸) and px(¸) the consumer price prevailing in the domestic and foreign
markets respectively, and assume that competition within each product occurs in a Bertrand
fashion. The possibility of costless imitation forces ¯rms to maximize pro¯ts by charging a
(limit) price no higher than pd(¸) = px(¸) = ¸w; where w is the common wage rate across
all countries, hereafter normalized to unity. This optimal pricing rule drives domestic and
foreign imitators out of the market and implies that ¯rms with higher-quality products
9Alternatively, one can assume that once a product is developed, its low-quality generic version can be
produced by a competitive fringe in all countries, i.e., technology di®uses instantly across all countries.
Analysis based on this assumption yields qualitatively the same results, and is available upon request.
Moreover, one can also assume that there is no international transfer of technology. This assumption would
allow exporters to charge a higher price abroad that would be proportional to the product's quality level
adjusted by per-unit trade costs. More precisely, in the absence of international technology transfer, the
quality leader charges two limit prices: pd(¸) = ¸ in the domestic market to get rid of the competitive
fringe; and (in the absence of a competitive foreign fringe) it charges an export limit price px(¸) = ¿¸ which
prevents the domestic fringe from exporting. In this case, all the results go through with the exception that
trade costs do not a®ect the export cuto® quality level.
9charge higher prices.10
The limit-pricing rule pd(¸) = px(¸) = ¸ and (2) yield
q(¸2)
q(¸1)
=
p(¸1)
p(¸2)
=
¸1
¸2
; (3)
which means that ¯rms with higher-quality products charge higher prices and sell lower
quantities. In addition, it is obvious from (2) that all ¯rms earn the same revenue p(¸)q(¸) =
EL=Mc; thanks to Cobb-Douglas preferences.
The per-period pro¯ts of exporting ¯rms can be decomposed into two parts: pro¯ts
earned from domestic sales ¼d(¸); and pro¯ts earned from sales in each of n export markets
¼x(¸):
¼d(¸) = [pd(¸) ¡ 1]qd(¸) ¡ fp = (1 ¡ ¸¡1)
EL
Mc
¡ fp: (4)
¼x(¸) = [px(¸) ¡ ¿]qx(¸) ¡ fx = (1 ¡ ¿¸¡1)
EL
Mc
¡ fx; (5)
where the quantities demanded by domestic and foreign consumers qd(¸) and qx(¸) are
given by (2) and pd(¸) = px(¸) = ¸:
It is important to emphasize that, as the Melitz model, our approach is isomorphic
to a model of process innovations, where ¯rm heterogeneity is derived from productivity
di®erences. The Appendix establishes formally that the latter yields the pro¯t functions
described by (4) and (5), an endogenous distribution of markups, and the property that
more productive ¯rms charge lower prices and produce more output. In summary, the com-
bination of Cobb-Douglas preferences and limit-pricing strategies generates an endogenous
distribution of markups that is missing from models that rely on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
preferences.11
10The Appendix shows formally how an augmented version of the consumer utility function (1) can
generate the aforementioned optimal limit-pricing rule.
11This feature of our model complements the productivity-heterogeneity model proposed by Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) which generates variable average markups based on quasi-linear (as opposed to homothetic)
preferences.
10We present the main results of our analysis using the quality (as opposed to produc-
tivity) version of the model in order to directly relate and compare our ¯ndings to the
theoretical and empirical literature that focuses on product quality as a determinant of the
pattern of intraindustry trade.12 One caveat of our model is that, under Cobb-Douglas
preferences, the revenue per variety is independent of the ¯rm's quality level and price. An-
other possible caveat (subject to the quali¯cation in footnote 8) is that under limit-pricing
each ¯rm charges the same price in all markets independently of per-unit trade costs. These
implications are clearly unrealistic. However, as in quality-ladders growth models, Cobb-
Douglas preferences deliver surprising tractability and preserve several desirable aggregate
properties.
Notice that symmetry of foreign markets implies that the global pro¯t °ow generated
by exporting equals n¼x(¸): Because only a fraction of incumbent ¯rms export, a ¯rm
producing a good with quality ¸ earns a per-period pro¯t ¼(¸) = ¼d(¸) + maxf0;n¼x(¸)g:
Since each ¯rm faces a constant probability of death ± in each period, the market value of
a typical ¯rm is given by
º(¸) = max
(
0;
1 X
t=0
(1 ¡ ±)t¼(¸)
)
= max
½
0;
1
±
¼(¸)
¾
; (6)
where the second equality follows from the fact that each ¯rm's product quality remains
constant during its lifetime.
A product of quality ¸ is produced only if ¼(¸) > 0: Therefore, the production cuto®
quality level ¸p is determined as follows. Equation (4) implies that ¼d(¸) increases in ¸;
and that ¼d(1) = ¡fd < 0: Thus, for any given values of fp > 0; E; and Mc (which are
common to all ¯rms), there exists a production cuto® quality level ¸p; such that all ¯rms
producing varieties with quality ¸ > ¸p earn non-negative pro¯ts and stay in the market.
Firms that know how to produce varieties with quality below the production cuto® quality
level ¸p exit the market. Setting (4) equal to zero generates the following production cuto®
12See, for instance, Schott (2004), Hummels and Skiba (2004), Hummels and Klenow (2005), Hallak (2006),
and Verhoogen (2008).
11quality level
¸p =
1
1 ¡ Mcfp=EL
> 1: (7)
The production cuto® quality level ¸p depends positively on production ¯xed costs fp;
and negatively on its market size EL=Mc: This makes sense: in markets with high ¯xed
production costs or low expenditure per variety, only high-quality (high-price) products can
earn non-negative pro¯ts.
A product with quality ¸ is exported to all foreign markets, only if ¼x(¸) > 0: Equation
(5) implies that, as long as ¸ > ¿ > 1 holds, ¼x(¸) increases monotonically in ¸; and that
¼x(¸) = ¡fx < 0: Therefore, for any fx > 0; E; and Mc there exists a cuto® quality level
¸x > ¿; such that all ¯rms producing products with quality ¸ > ¸x earn non-negative pro¯ts
from exporting to any foreign market. However, ¯rms that produce varieties with quality
¸ < ¸x face strictly negative foreign pro¯ts and do not export. Setting (5) equal to zero
yields the following export cuto® quality level
¸x =
¿
1 ¡ Mcfx=EL
> ¿ > 1: (8)
The export cuto® quality level ¸x depends positively on factors (such as variable trade
costs ¿ and foreign-market entry costs fx) that adversely a®ect pro¯ts from exporting; and
negatively on factors (such as foreign market size EL=Mc) that have a positive impact on
export pro¯ts.
Solving (7) for EL=Mc and substituting the resulting expression in (8) yields
¸x =
¿
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¸¡1
p )(fx=fp)
: (9)
Equation (9), together with the restrictions imposed by (7) and (8), establishes the depen-
dence of the exporting cuto® quality level ¸x on the production cuto® quality level ¸p and
the model's parameters. The requirement that the denominator of (9) must be non-negative
implies that ¸p 2 (1;k); where k = 1=[1¡fp=fx]: Inspection of (9) also indicates that ¸x is a
12monotonically increasing function of the production cuto® quality level ¸p 2 (1;k); the level
of per-unit trade costs ¿; and the ratio of overhead ¯xed costs fx=fp: In addition, if fx = fp;
then (9) implies that ¸x = ¿¸p > ¸p for all ¸p 2 (1;1): Therefore, under the parameter
restrictions fx > fp and ¿ > 1; the exporting cuto® quality level ¸x is strictly greater than
the production cuto® quality level ¸p: In this case, ¯rms whose product quality level is less
than ¸p exit; ¯rms whose product quality level is ¸ 2 [¸p;¸x) produce exclusively for the
domestic market because they earn non-negative pro¯ts from the domestic operations only;
and ¯rms producing high-quality products (¸ > ¸x) sell their products in both domestic
and all foreign markets.
A su±cient condition for the partition of ¯rms by export status is that the overhead
costs of operating in the domestic market fp must not exceed the overhead costs of entering
a foreign market fx: A similar condition has been derived by Melitz (2003, p. 1709) for
the case of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) preferences. However, in Melitz's model, no level of
trade costs ¿ can generate the aforementioned partitioning in the absence of exporting ¯xed
costs (fx = 0). In contrast, the present model generates this partitioning due to the limit-
pricing behavior of ¯rms. Notice that, in the absence of ¯xed exporting costs, equation (9)
yields ¸x = ¿: In addition, observe that as the level of production ¯xed costs approaches
zero (fp ! 0) equation (7) yields ¸p ! 1: By continuity, the present model can deliver
the partition of ¯rms by export status under su±ciently high trade costs combined with
low production ¯xed costs. This property leads to a novel prediction: a ¯rm facing foreign
markets with su±ciently di®erent trade costs will not export to markets with high trade
costs.13
This prediction is consistent with the empirical ¯ndings of Schott (2004, ¯gure 2) and
13This possibility is illustrated with the following simple example. Consider the case of a ¯rm producing a
product with quality ¸ and facing two foreign markets, one with a low per-unit trade costs ¿0 and one with
high per-unit trade costs ¿1 such that 1 < ¿0 < ¸ < ¿1: In addition, assume that production and exporting
¯xed costs are equal to zero (fp = fx = 0). It is obvious from equations (4) and (5) that this ¯rm earns
positive pro¯ts in the domestic market and in the low-trade-costs market, but strictly negative pro¯ts in
the high-trade-costs market and will not export to the latter. Similar considerations apply to the model of
productivity heterogeneity and quasi-linear preferences developed by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
13Baldwin and Harrigan (2007). The former study uses U.S. product level data and reports
that in 1994 about 90 percent of ten-digit HS product categories and almost 80 percent
of 4-digit SITC categories exhibited zero imports! The second study argues that trade
costs are positively correlated with the absence of U.S. exports in narrowly de¯ned product
categories. Models of ¯rm heterogeneity that rely on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) preferences
cannot generate this prediction, thanks to constant markup pricing across all varieties.
The following proposition summarizes the aforementioned analysis.
Proposition 1. Let ¸p and ¸x denote the production and export cuto® quality levels, re-
spectively; and let k = 1=[1¡fp=fx] denote the upper bound of the production cuto® quality
level ¸p: Then,
a. The export cuto® quality level ¸x is an increasing function of the production cuto®
quality ¸p:
b. If the production ¯xed cost does not exceed the foreign-market entry cost (i.e., fp 6 fx),
then the export cuto® quality level is strictly greater than the production cuto® quality
level (i.e., ¸x > ¸p > 1).
c. In the absence of foreign market entry cost (i.e., fx = 0), there exists a level of trade
cost such that the exporting cuto® quality level is strictly greater than the production
cuto® quality level (i.e., ¸x = ¿ > ¸p > 1).
Proposition 1 implies that ¯rms with high-quality products charge higher prices, enjoy
higher pro¯ts and ship these products abroad in accordance to the Alchian and Allen (1964)
conjecture, which has been con¯rmed empirically by Hammels and Skiba (2004). Our
paper develops a general equilibrium model in which trade costs and self-selection among
heterogeneous ¯rms lead to the desired result.
142.3 Entry Decision
The determination of the production cuto® quality level depends on entry and exit con-
siderations. We assume that there is a large number of prospective and ex-ante identical
entrants. Each entrant faces a ¯xed entry cost fe > 0; which is measured in units of labor
and interpreted as the number of R&D researchers employed by the entrant to discover
a new variety. After a ¯rm incurs the ¯xed entry cost, it draws its quality parameter ¸
from a common and known distribution g(¸) with positive support over (0;1) and with
continuous cumulative distribution G(¸): The properties of g(¸) determine the bene¯ts of
entry measured by the relevant expected discounted pro¯ts.
The ex-ante probability of drawing a quality level ¸ is governed by the density function
g(¸) and the ex-ante probability of successful entry 1 ¡ G(¸p): As in Melitz (2003), the
ex-post distribution of product quality levels ¹ is the conditional distribution of g(¸) on the
interval [¸p;1) :
¹(¸) =
(
g(¸)
1¡G(¸p) if ¸ > ¸p
0 otherwise
(10)
The ex-ante probability that an incumbent ¯rm will export is given by
³x =
1 ¡ G(¸x)
1 ¡ G(¸p)
: (11)
In addition, the law of large numbers implies that ³x equals the ex-post fraction of incumbent
¯rms that export.
Let Mp denote the mass of varieties (and ¯rms) produced in any country and Mx be the
number of varieties that each country exports. Then, we have Mx = ³xMp; which further
ensures that Mc = (1 + n³x)Mp is the the mass of products available for consumption in
any country. Armed with the aforementioned probability distributions, one can calculate
the aggregate quantities demanded:
Qc =
Z 1
¸p
q(¸)Mp¹(¸)d¸ + n
Z 1
¸x
q(¸)Mp¹(¸)d¸ =
Mp
Mc
EL
~ ¸p
+
nMx
Mc
EL
~ ¸x
; (12)
15where ¸i (i = p;x) is given by
~ ¸i ´ ~ ¸(¸i) =
·
1
1 ¡ G(¸i)
Z 1
¸i
¸¡1g(¸)d¸
¸¡1
: (13)
That is, ~ ¸p is the weighted harmonic mean of the quality levels (and prices) of all produced
goods and can be interpreted as the average (expected) quality level. Similarly, ~ ¸x is the
weighted harmonic mean of the quality levels of a country's exports and can be interpreted
as the average export quality.
Because the production cuto® quality level is the minimum quality level of all surviving
products, it must be lower than the average quality level. Moreover, an increase in ¸p
forces producers with low-quality products to exit the market, which in turn increases the
average quality level of all produced varieties. The same intuition applies to the relationship
between the export quality cuto® level and the average quality of exports. The following
lemma summarizes these properties (see Appendix for proof).
Lemma 1. The average quality level of all products produced in a typical market is strictly
greater and increases in the production cuto® quality level, i.e., ~ ¸p > ¸p and @~ ¸p=@¸p > 0:
The average quality level of exports is strictly greater and increases in the export cuto®
quality level, i.e., ~ ¸x > ¸x and @~ ¸x=@¸x > 0:
The ex-ante quantity demanded for each variety is obtained by dividing (12) by Mp and
is given by
¹ q = ~ ¸¡1
p EL=Mc + n³x~ ¸¡1
x EL=Mc; (14)
where ¯rst and second terms correspond to the domestic and foreign demand for a typical
variety, respectively. Consequently, the ex-ante per-period pro¯t of a typical prospective
entrant is given by
¹ ¼ = ¼d(~ ¸p) + n³x¼x(~ ¸x) = (1 ¡ ~ ¸¡1
p )
EL
Mc
¡ fp + n³x
·
(1 ¡ ¿~ ¸¡1
x )
EL
Mc
¡ fx
¸
: (15)
16Because the probability of successful entry is 1¡G(¸p); the net bene¯ts of entering the
domestic market are equal to the expected value of a ¯rm [1 ¡ G(¸p)]¹ º; where ¹ º = ¹ ¼=± is
the ex-ante value of a prospective entrant. Setting the bene¯ts of entry equal to the ¯xed
R&D costs yields the free-entry condition
[1 ¡ G(¸p)]
¹ ¼
±
= fe; (16)
where ¹ ¼ is de¯ned by (15). This concludes the description of the model.
2.4 Steady-State Equilibrium
This section determines the market cuto® quality levels, number of varieties, the average
markups, and the welfare level in a typical country. Substituting (9) and (11) in (15) yields
an expression for ex-ante pro¯ts that depends only on the two cuto® quality levels. Further
substitution of ¹ ¼ into the free-entry condition (16) yields the basic steady-state equilibrium
condition
H(¸p;1) + n
µ
fx
fp
¶
H(¸x;¿) = ±
fe
fp
; (17)
where H is de¯ned as
H(¸i;®) ´ [1 ¡ G(¸i)]
"
1 ¡ ®~ ¸¡1
i
1 ¡ ®¸¡1
i
¡ 1
#
; (18)
where (i;®) 2 f(p;1);(x;¿)g:
The export cuto® quality level ¸x is an increasing function of ¸p (see equation (9)). In
addition, the Appendix proves that H is strictly decreasing in cuto® levels and that the
left-hand-side of equation (17) is also decreasing in ¸p 2 (1;k): The above considerations
imply the following result (see Appendix for proof).
Proposition 2. Let k = 1=(1 ¡ fp=fx) and assume that fp < fx: There exist a unique
production and a unique export cuto® quality levels ¸p 2 (1;k) and ¸x 2 (¿;1) which
satisfy equations (9) and (17) such that ¸p > 1; ¸x > ¿; and ¸x > ¸p:
17Once the two cuto® quality levels are determined, one can solve for the values of the
remaining endogenous variables. We start with the determination of the mass of products
produced in each market. In the steady-state equilibrium, the per-period °ow of successful
entrants must be equal to °ow of incumbents who exit the market because they are hit
by a bad shock, i.e., [1 ¡ G(¸p)]Me = ±Mp; where Me is the mass of all (as opposed to
successful) entrants. Then the aggregate amount of labor employed by prospective entrants
is Le = Mefe = ±Mpfe=[1 ¡ G(¸p)] = Mp¹ ¼; where the last equality follows from the free-
entry condition (16). Thus the aggregate amount of labor devoted to R&D equals the level
of aggregate pro¯ts earned by all producers in a typical market.
The aggregate demand for labor in a typical market equals the aggregate supply of
labor Lp + Le = Lp + ¦ = L; where Lp denotes the total amount of labor employed in the
production of surviving goods and ¦ is the level of aggregate pro¯ts earned by all producers.
In addition, the standard GDP identity implies that the total wage bill must be equal to
the aggregate expenditure on all goods produced wLp + wLe = EL: Therefore, per-capita
expenditure equals unity due to the choice of labor as the numeraire, i.e., E = w = 1:
Substituting E = 1 in (7) yields the mass of products available for consumption Mc
Mc = (1 ¡ ¸¡1
p )
L
fp
: (19)
Substituting14 the relationship Mc = (1 + n³x)Mp into (19) yields the mass of varieties
produced in each country
Mp =
"
1 ¡ ¸¡1
p
1 + n³x
#
L
fp
: (20)
14We can now derive a su±cient condition which guarantees that the consumer consumes all available
varieties. In principle, each consumer chooses q(!) (the quantity of each variety) and M (the number of
varieties) to maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint. The ¯rst order condition with respect to M
yields ln[¯¸(M)q(M)=L] > 1; which holds with equality if M < Mc: Inserting (2) into this condition yields
ln[¯¸(M)E=[p(M)M]] > 1: Thus to ensure that the principle of non-satiation holds (i.e., M = Mc), we
must have that ln[¯¸(Mc)E=[p(Mc)Mc]] > 1: Since p(Mc) = ¸(Mc) and E = 1; we must have ln(¯=Mc) > 1;
that is ¯ > eMc; where e is the base of the natural logarithm. Using (19) implies that ¯fp=eL > 1 ¡ ¸
¡1
p :
Moreover, because ¸p 2 (1;k); the inequality condition holds if ¯fp=eL > 1 ¡ k
¡1; which in turn yields
¯ > eL=fx:
18Notice that in the absence of trade (n = 0) the mass of varieties produced equals the mass
of varieties consumed, i.e., Mc = Mp:
As we mentioned in the introduction, the model generates an endogenous distribution
of markups. Each incumbent ¯rm charges a price equal to its quality level p(¸) = ¸;
and therefore its markup measured by the price marginal-cost margin as given by (p ¡
1)=p = 1 ¡ ¸¡1: Subsequently, the aggregate markup over all incumbents equals PCMp =
R 1
¸p (1 ¡ ¸¡1)Mp¹(¸)d¸ = Mp(1 ¡ ~ ¸¡1
p ): Similarly, an exporter charges a price p(¸) = ¸;
incurs a marginal cost ¿; and earns a price marginal-cost margin (p ¡ ¿)=p = 1 ¡ ¿¸¡1:
Thus the aggregate export markup is PCMx =
R 1
¸x(1 ¡ ¿¸¡1)Mp¹(¸)d¸ = Mx(1 ¡ ¿~ ¸¡1
x ):
Consequently, the average production (domestic) and export markups are given by
pcmp = 1 ¡ ~ ¸¡1
p and pcmx = 1 ¡ ¿~ ¸¡1
x ; (21)
where ~ ¸p and ~ ¸x are de¯ned by (13). Both average markups increase in the production
cuto® quality level ¸p (see Proposition 1), but the average export markup decreases in the
level of trade costs ¿:
One can obtain an expression for per capita welfare as follows. Substituting the per-
capita quantity demanded q(¸)=L = E=¸Mc for each variety into the utility function of a
typical consumer (1) and performing the integration yields
U = Mc ln
µ
¯E
Mc
¶
= Mc ln
µ
¯
Mc
¶
; (22)
where per-capita expenditure E is set equal to unity due to the choice of labor as the
numeraire. Since ln(¯=Mc) > 1 (see footnote 14), U is always positive. Observe that
per-capita welfare depends positively on the mass of varieties consumed Mc and on the
expenditure per variety E=Mc:
To unveil the intuition for the welfare expression notice that an increase in Mc has two
con°icting welfare e®ects. First, each consumer becomes better o® because she consumes
more products. Second, she becomes worse o® as her expenditure, which is equal to her
19wage, spreads among more varieties. Limit pricing renders the consumer indi®erent between
receiving q units of a generic product with quality 1 and q=¸ units of a good with quality
¸ at a higher price p(¸) = ¸; and thus the average quality does not appear directly as an
argument in the welfare function. Higher average quality allows ¯rms to reduce the demand
for manufacturing labor by charging a higher price and producing less quantity per variety.
This, in turn, means that the economy can a®ord the production of more varieties and enjoy
a higher welfare level.
3 The Impact of International Trade
The model is well suited to analyze the general equilibrium e®ects of trade liberalization
measured by an increase in the number of trading partners n; a reduction in per-unit trade
costs ¿; and a reduction in exporting overhead costs fx: These parameters capture a variety
of forces including reductions in transportation and communication costs, reductions in
trade barriers, and the formation of trading blocks (albeit in a highly stylized fashion given
the assumption of structurally identical countries). The impact of trade liberalization is
channeled through two interacting general-equilibrium channels: changes in the demand
for labor, which are captured by changes in the real wage; and changes in the intensity of
product-market competition, which are captured by changes in the average markup.
Formally, the e®ects of trade liberalization are transmitted through changes in the pro-
duction cuto® quality level ¸p as are described in Lemma 2 (see Appendix for proof).
Lemma 2. Trade liberalization, captured by an increase in the number of trading partners
(n "), a reduction in per-unit transport costs (¿ #), or a reduction in foreign-market entry
costs (fx #), increases the production cuto® quality level ¸p (i.e., @¸p=@n > 0; @¸p=@¿ < 0;
and @¸p=@fx < 0).
The economic intuition behind Lemma 2 is as follows. For any initial value of the
production cuto® quality level ¸p; the export cuto® quality level ¸x and the mass of varieties
consumed Mc are ¯xed (see equations (9) and (19)). Equation (9) and Lemma 1 imply that
20a decline in ¿ or fx increases the average quality of exports ~ ¸x: Therefore, any form of trade
liberalization (n "; ¿ #; or fx #) increases the ex-ante pro¯ts ¹ ¼ (see equation (15) and raises
the demand for labor for any wage level (see equation (16) and, in particular, equation (17)).
The excess demand for labor induces a reallocation of resources from low-quality products
towards high-quality products that translates into a larger mass of products available for
consumption Mc: To see this, recall that for any level of expenditure, a ¯rm with a higher
quality product charges a higher price, produces less output, and employs less labor than
a ¯rm with a lower quality product (see equation (3)). Thus any given aggregate supply of
labor can sustain more higher-quality products.
The reallocation of resources from lower to higher-quality products increases the demand
for varieties and intensi¯es the product market competition by reducing the demand for each
product as the aggregate expenditure EL is spread among more varieties. Consequently,
the °ow of pro¯ts of the marginal ¯rm, which produces a product with the cuto® quality
level ¸p; become negative, and induce an increase in the production cuto® quality level to
restore the zero-pro¯t condition (7) that determines ¸p: An increase in the production cuto®
quality level ¸p; caused by trade liberalization, generates quality upgrading (measured by
an increase in the average quality) and increases the average markup by shifting resources
from low to high-quality products. Consequently, in the present model, trade liberaliza-
tion operates primarily through the increased intensity of product-market competition and
the associated increase in the mass of sustainable products (as opposed to a reduction in
markups).
The next step of the analysis is to establish the impact of trade liberalization on markups,
on the number of varieties consumed, and on welfare. First, consider the impact of trade
liberalization on the intensity of product-market competition captured by the domestic
and export markups de¯ned by (21). Any type of trade liberalization increases ¸p and ¸x
(from Lemmas 1 and 2) and increases both domestic and export markups (see equation
(21)). In addition, inspection of equation (19) and Lemma 2 establish that any form of
21trade liberalization increases the production cuto® quality level ¸p and the mass of varieties
available for consumption Mc in every country. Finally, di®erentiating equation (22) with
respect to varieties consumed yields @U=@Mc = ln(¯=Mc) ¡ 1 > 0; where the inequality
directly follows from our assumption on ¯ (see footnote 14). Thus, the e®ect of trade
liberalization on welfare is positive. We have established:
Proposition 3. Trade liberalization, captured by an increase in the number of trading
partners (n " ), a reduction in per-unit transport costs (¿ #), or a reduction in foreign-
market entry costs (fx #):
a. increases the average domestic and export markups (pcmp "; pcmx ");
b. raises the mass of products available for consumption (Mc ");
c. and has a positive e®ect on national and global welfare (U ").
Next consider an extreme form of trade liberalization: the move from autarky to (re-
stricted) trade. The closed-economy steady-state equilibrium corresponds to the case of no
trading partners (i.e., n = 0). Equation (17) then implies that, under autarky, the produc-
tion cuto® quality level ¸A
p is determined by H(¸p;1) = ±fe=fp; and is strictly less than the
open-economy cuto® quality level ¸p : the absence of export markets reduces the bene¯ts of
entry and shifts labor from the production of higher-quality products towards the produc-
tion of lower-quality products. Observe that equations (19), (21), and (22) determine the
closed-economy values the number of varieties consumed (MA
p = MA
c = [1 ¡ (¸A
p )¡1]L=fp),
the average markups (pcmA
p = 1 ¡ (~ ¸A
p )¡1), and the level of welfare (UA = MA
c ln(¯=MA
c ))
which are all functions of the production cuto® quality level. Therefore, a move from au-
tarky to trade has the same qualitative impact as an increase in the number of trading
partners n: These e®ects are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. A move from autarky to trade
a. increases the production cuto® quality level (¸p > ¸A
p );
22b. generates higher markups (pcmp > pcmA
p );
c. raises the mass of products available for consumption (Mc > MA
c );
d. and has a positive e®ect on national and global welfare (U > UA).
As in Melitz's (2003) analysis, trade liberalization induces entry of better ¯rms into
foreign markets, forces ¯rms with low-quality products to exit, and expands the number
of varieties consumed. The model's prediction that trade liberalization increases industry
markups in markets with Bertrand competition and vertical product di®erentiation is based
on a novel mechanism that complements the work of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). In
their model, trade liberalization intensi¯es the product market competition via a change
in the price elasticity of demand, whereas in the present model trade expands the mass of
varieties and reduces the income spent on each product without a®ecting the price elasticity
of demand. In Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) trade reduces average markups, whereas in the
present model, trade generates quality upgrading and higher average markups. The next
section explores formally this important issue by analyzing the model's welfare properties.
4 Welfare Properties
The presence of quality-heterogeneous ¯rms raises the following welfare question: does the
market provide the socially optimal quality cuto® levels, markups, and the mass of available
varieties? The constrained optimality (in the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) sense, where ¯rms
make non negative pro¯ts) of the cuto® productivity levels has been demonstrated in a multi-
sector version of the Melitz model by Feenstra and Kee (2008). This is a surprising result
considering the presence of potential welfare distortions caused by imperfect competition,
trade costs, and heterogeneous productivity levels.
Contrary to the existing literature on trade with heterogeneous ¯rms, the present model
generates the possibility of divergence between the socially optimal and laissez-faire equilib-
rium due to the endogenous distribution of markups. In order to minimize the algebra, we
23illustrate this possibility in a closed-economy setting noting that similar considerations ap-
ply to an open economy, where trade costs create additional welfare distortions. The social
planner maximizes per-capita utility function U = Mc ln(¯E=Mc) subject to the resource
constraint. Since labor is the only factor of production, the resource constraint requires
that at each instant in time labor is fully employed. The aggregate supply of labor L is
¯xed, whereas the aggregate demand for labor consists of two components: labor employed
by potential entrants Le = ±Mcfe=[1¡G(¸p)]; where the mass of varieties produced equals
the mass of varieties consumed (Mp = Mc); and labor employed in production. The latter
is derived as follows. Since one unit of labor produces one unit of output, each surviving
¯rm hires fp+q(¸) workers, where fp is the production ¯xed cost expressed in units of labor
and q(¸) is the demand for a product of quality ¸ given by (2). Thus the labor employed in
production is Lp =
R 1
¸p [fp + q(¸)]Mc¹(¸)d¸ = fpMc + ~ ¸¡1
p EL: Consequently the resource
constraint is
±Mcfe
1 ¡ G(¸p)
+ fpMc + ~ ¸¡1
p EL = L: (23)
The social planner maximizes U = Mc ln(¯E=Mc) subject to (23) with respect to the
production cuto® quality level ¸p; per-capita expenditure E; and the mass of varieties
available for consumption Mc: Denoting with Ã the Lagrangian multiplier, one can write
the corresponding ¯rst-order conditions as follows.
(¸¡1
p ¡ ~ ¸¡1
p )(E=Mc)L = ±fe=[1 ¡ G(¸p)]; (24)
1=Ã = ~ ¸¡1
p (E=Mc)L; (25)
(1=Ã)[ln(¯E=Mc) ¡ 1] ¡ fp = ±fe=[1 ¡ G(¸p)]: (26)
These conditions determine the socially optimum values of ¸p; E; and Mc: Equation (25)
implies that the Lagrangian multiplier must be positive (Ã > 0).
We can obtain further insights on the solution to the social planner's problem by sub-
stituting (25) into (26) and equating the resulting expression to (24) to obtain
h
~ ¸¡1
p ln(¯E=Mc) ¡ ¸¡1
p
i
(E=Mc)L = fp: (27)
24Since the average quality level ~ ¸p is a function of the cuto® quality level ¸p; equations
(24) and (27) determine the socially optimal values of ¸S
p and ES=MS
c : Once these two
endogenous variables are determined, the resource constraint (23), or the assumption Es =
1; can be used to obtain individual values for ES and MS
c :
How does the socially optimum solution compare to the closed-economy market equi-
librium? Set the number of trading partners n equal to zero in (15) and substitute the
resulting expression for ¹ ¼ and fp from condition (7) into (16) to obtain the closed-economy
free-entry condition which is identical to (24). In other words, for any level of E=Mc the
laissez-faire cuto® quality level ¸A
p is socially e±cient. This result, which is identical to the
ones obtain by Feenstra and Kee (2008), holds because the cuto® quality level does not
appear as an argument in the social planner's objective function, but only in the resource
constraint. Thus, the social planner chooses the cuto® quality level based on e±cient re-
source allocation considerations. In the case of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) preferences and
exogenous markups, the welfare distortions associated with a marginal increase in the mass
of varieties just happen to cancel each other out. However, this is not the case in the
present model. To see this, note that the market equilibrium values ¸A
p and EA=MA
c are
simultaneously determined by the entry condition (24) and the zero-pro¯t condition (7).
The latter is reproduced below for illustrative purposes
[1 ¡ ¸¡1
p ](E=Mc)L = fp: (28)
Comparing the zero-pro¯t condition (28) to the socially-optimal condition (27) reveals
the following. The market cuto® quality level depends on pro¯tability considerations that
are captured by the marginal markup 1 ¡ ¸¡1
p : This di®ers from the e±cient \markup"
~ ¸¡1
p ln(¯E=Mc)¡¸¡1
p in (27) which depends on the ratio between the marginal utility derived
from an additional variety and the average quality of available products. Observe that the
social planner and the market assign the same total cost to the product with the cuto®
quality level, namely fp+¸¡1
p (E=Mc)L: However, there is a divergence between the bene¯ts
associated with the introduction of a new variety. The market cares about the total revenue
25earned ¸p[EL=(Mc¸p)] = EL=Mc; where the term in square brackets equals the quantity
demanded and ¸p is the corresponding limit price. In contrast, equation (27) reveals that the
social bene¯ts of introducing an additional product equal fln(¯E=Mc)g[EL=Mc~ ¸p]; where
the term in curly brackets is the change in consumer surplus (welfare) associated with the
introduction of a new variety (for any given expenditure per variety E=Mc), and the term in
square brackets represents the quantity demanded for a product with average (as opposed
to marginal) quality.
In other words, the planner cares about the average (infra-marginal) consumer, whereas
the market cares about the marginal consumer. On one hand, because the marginal quality
level is less than the average quality level (¸p < ~ ¸p), the market has a tendency to overstate
the bene¯ts of introducing a new variety by charging a lower \price" and producing a higher
quantity than the social planner. On the other hand, because ln(¯E=Mc) > 1 and ¸p > 1
the ranking between the social and market prices is in general ambiguous. Consequently,
there is a divergence between the market and social valuation of the marginal bene¯ts
associated with an introduction of an additional variety, and inspection of equations (23),
(24), (27) and (28) yields the following proposition.
Proposition 5. The laissez-faire cuto® quality level ¸A
p ; mass of varieties MA
c ; and per-
capita expenditure EA are socially sub-optimal.
How does the market solution di®er from the socially optimum solution? Figure 1
illustrates the market and e±cient values of ¸p and E=Mc by plotting the graphs of equations
(24), (27), and (28) under the assumption that quality levels are drawn from a Pareto
distribution with scale parameter b and shape parameter · > 0;
G(¸) = 1 ¡
µ
b
¸
¶·
for ¸ > b > 0: (29)
Assuming that quality levels follow a Pareto distribution is not essential in our analysis.
However, it makes the analysis analytically more tractable. For example, using this distri-
bution function in (13) yields ~ ¸i=¸i = (· + 1)=·; for i = p;x:
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FIGURE 1. E±cient and Market Cuto® Quality Levels
Equation (24) de¯nes a direct relationship between E=Mc and ¸p which is illustrated
with the convex FF curve in Figure 1.15 Equation (28) de¯nes an inverse relationship
between E=Mc and ¸p; which is illustrated with the negatively-sloped MM curve.16 The
unique intersection between the FF and MM curves at point A determines the market cuto®
quality level ¸A
p : The graph of equation (27) is illustrated with the concave SS curve.17 More
interestingly, at any intersection point of the FF and SS curves, the slope of the FF curve
is greater than that of the SS curve.18 Thus, the most the FF and SS curves can intersect
each other is once.19 We assume that the parameters of the model are such that the FF
15With the above cumulative distribution function, equation (24) becomes E=Mc = (·+1)±fe¸
·+1
p =(Lb
·):
16Equation (28) can be written as E=Mc = fp=[(1 ¡ ¸
¡1
p )L]; which implies that E=Mc is decreasing in
¸p; E=Mc ! 1 as ¸p ! 1; and E=Mc ! fp=L as ¸p ! 1:
17With the Pareto distribution de¯ned by (29), equation (27) becomes [·ln(¯E=Mc) ¡ (· + 1)](E=Mc) =
(·+1)¸pfp=L: Totally di®erentiating this equation yields d(E=Mc)=d¸p = (·+1)fp[L·ln(¯E=Mc)¡L]
¡1 >
0; where the last inequality follows from the facts that ·ln(¯E=Mc)¡(·+1) > 0 and · > 0: Di®erentiation
of this slope with respect to ¸p implies that d
2(E=Mc)=d¸
2
p = ¡·[d(E=Mc)d¸p]
2 f(E=Mc)[·ln(¯E=Mc) ¡
1)]g
¡1 < 0:
18To see this, notice that the slope of the FF curve is given by d(E=Mc)=d¸p = (· + 1)(E=Mc)=¸p: The
slope of the SS curve, on the other hand, can be rewritten as d(E=Mc)=d¸p = (· + 1)(fp=L)(E=Mc)[(· +
1)(fp=L)¸p + ·(E=Mc)]
¡1: It then easily follows that at any intersection (¸p;E=Mc); (· + 1)(E=Mc)=¸p >
(· + 1)(E=Mc)(fp=L)=[(· + 1)(fp=L)¸p + ·(E=Mc)]:
19The slope of the SS curve is generally indeterminate under other distribution functions. In this case,
the SS curve may intersect the FF curve more than once, and hence, might give rise to multiple socially
optimum cuto® quality levels.
27and SS curves intersect at point B, at which the socially optimum cuto® level is greater
than the market cuto® level, i.e., ¸S
p > ¸A
p :20
Figure 1 can be used to perform more comparative statics exercises. An increase in
production ¯xed cost fp does not a®ect the position of the FF curve, shifts the MM curve
to the right raising ¸A
p and EA=MA
c ; while it shifts the SS curve to the left raising ¸S
p
and ES=MS
c : Intuitively, an economy facing higher production ¯xed costs allocates a larger
share of resources to the creation of more varieties than to the production of low-quality
products. An increase in market size, measured by the labor endowment L; shifts the FF
and SS curves to the right and the MM curve to the left (not shown in Figure 1). The
magnitude of the FF curve shift equals the magnitude of the MM shift and exceeds the
corresponding magnitude of the SS curve shift.21 Therefore, an increase in market size L
lowers E=Mc; raises the e±cient cuto® quality level ¸S
p; and does not a®ect the market
cuto® quality level ¸A
p :
5 Conclusion
The present paper developed a highly-tractable model of quality heterogeneity and inter-
national trade. Firms in our model face Cobb-Douglas preferences and charge prices that
are proportional to the quality level of their products as in Schumpeterian growth models.
The production side of the model mimics the model of productivity heterogeneity pro-
posed by Melitz (2003). In our model, ¯rms with high-quality products export, ¯rms with
intermediate-quality products produce for the domestic market, and ¯rms with low-quality
20Equation (27) implies that ln(¯E=Mc) > (· + 1)=·; i.e., E=Mc > exp(1 + 1=·)=¯: At ¸p = 1; equation
(24) yields E=Mc = (·+1)±(fe=L)b
¡·: Given that ± < 1 and fe=L < 1; unless b is too low and · is too high,
as ¸p approaches 1 the SS curve intercept is higher than the FF curve intercept. In depicting Figure 1, we
assume that these conditions are satis¯ed. Also notice that when k increases the FF curve becomes steeper
(assuming that b 6 1). In this case, the FF curve may intersect the SS curve at a point to the left of point
C in Figure 1, which implies that the socially optimum cuto® level is smaller than the market cuto® level
¸
A
p :
21 Totally di®erentiating equations (24), (28) and (27) yields the marginal shifts of the FF curve
d(E=Mc)=dL = ¡(E=Mc)=L; the MM curve d(E=Mc)=dL = ¡(E=Mc)=L; and the SS curve d(E=Mc)=dL =
¡[(E=Mc)=L]
n
[~ ¸
¡1
p ln(¯E=Mc) ¡ ¸
¡1
p ]=[~ ¸
¡1
p + ~ ¸
¡1
p ln(¯E=Mc) ¡ ¸
¡1
p ]
o
: The term in curly brackets is posi-
tive, less than one, and implies that the magnitude of the SS curve shift is less than that of the FF curve.
28products exit the market. This trade pattern is consistent with the ¯ndings of several em-
pirical studies and the Alchian-Allen conjecture. Firms producing high-quality products
charge high prices and enjoy high markups, whereas ¯rms producing low-quality products
charge low prices and charge low markups.
The model generates several novel results that complement those of the existing theory
of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous ¯rms. First, the distribution of markups,
the mass of varieties consumed and produced, the real wage, and cuto® quality levels are
all endogenous and determined by general equilibrium forces. Therefore, the model delivers
a general equilibrium mechanism, based on endogenous markups and endogenous factor
prices, which governs the impact of trade on intra-industry reallocation of resources. Second,
trade liberalization (or a move from autarky to trade) raises the intensity of product market
competition, increases the cuto® quality levels, increases the average markups and forces
ine±cient ¯rms producing lower-quality products to exit the market. The welfare impact of
trade liberalization (or a move from autarky to trade) is positive. However, the laissez-faire
cuto® quality levels are socially suboptimal. The main reason behind this ine±ciency is
the ambiguous welfare ranking between the market and socially optimal markups. This, in
turn, leaves room for welfare-improving government intervention.
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32Appendix
A. Limit Pricing
Consider the following utility function, which is a generic version of the preferences used
routinely in quality-ladders growth models, that describes the tastes of a typical consumer
U =
Z
!2­
ln
·
¯
q0
L
+ ¯¸(!)
q(!)
L
¸
d!;
where ­ denotes the set of potential varieties. Each variety is associated with two quality
levels: q(¸(!)) that can be produced by only one ¯rm as in our model, and the low-quality
(generic) version q0 that can be produced by a competitive fringe after the original product
has been produced. We assume that the low-quality version can be produced under constant
marginal costs equal to the wage and perfect competition. This implies that the generic
product commands a price p0 = w = 1: In addition, since both goods adjusted for quality are
identical, a consumer spends her income only on the good with the lower quality adjusted
price. Thus, if a consumer buys only the generic good q0; she obtains a utility level equal
to ln(¯E=[p0McL]) = ln(¯E=[McL]); whereas if she buys the high-quality good she obtains
a utility level equal to ln(¯¸E=[p(¸)McL]):
Therefore the consumer is indi®erent between the two quality versions of the product
if and only if p(¸) = ¸: If the high-quality producer sets a limit price p ¡ "; where " is
in¯nitesimally small, she maximizes pro¯ts and drives the competitive fringe out of the
market. Following the standard practice of quality-ladders growth models, we assume that
even if " = 0; all consumers buy the high-quality version of each product even if in principle
they are indi®erent between the two quality versions of each good.
B. Productivity Heterogeneity
Following the spirit of Taylor (1993), suppose that the utility function of the representative
consumer is given by
U =
Z
!2­
ln[¯q(!)]d!:
33The demand for a typical variety is q(!) = EL=(p(!)Mc) as in the main text. Assume
that ¯rms discover new varieties associated with a productivity level ¸(!); and once the
product is developed and sold in the market it can be produced by a competitive fringe
with marginal and average costs equal to the wage w = 1: The marginal cost of a ¯rm with
productivity level ¸(!) is 1=¸(!): Consider the pro¯t °ow of a ¯rm with productivity ¸
which charges the limit price w ¡ " = 1 ¡ "; where " ! 0; to drive the competitive fringe
out of the market. The pro¯t °ow is given by
¼(!) = p(!)q(!) ¡ (1=¸)q(!) ¡ fp = (1 ¡ ¸¡1)
EL
Mc
¡ fp;
which is identical to (4) in the main text. Limit-pricing strategies and Cobb-Douglas tastes
generate a model with heterogeneous productivity and markups: More productive ¯rms
charge lower prices and earn higher pro¯ts as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
C. Proof of Lemma 1
Substitute ¸¡1
p > ¸¡1 in the integral expression of equation (13) to obtain
~ ¸¡1
p <
Z 1
¸p
¸¡1
p g(¸)d¸=[1 ¡ G(¸p)] = ¸¡1
p ;
which yields ~ ¸p > ¸p: Di®erentiation of (13) yields @~ ¸p=@¸p = ~ ¸p¹(¸p)(¸¡1
p ¡ ~ ¸¡1
p ) > 0:
The same logic and calculations apply to ~ ¸x de¯ned by (13). Q.E.D.
D. Proof of Proposition 2
We will prove that H(¸i;®) de¯ned in (18) is strictly decreasing in ¸i: Let J(¸i;®) =
[1 ¡ G(¸i)](1 ¡ ®~ ¸¡1
i ): Since ¸i > ®; it easily follows that J(¸i;®) > 0: Applying the
Leibnitz rule in calculus, we have
dJ(¸i;®)=d¸i = ¡(1 ¡ ®¸¡1
i )g(¸i):
Di®erentiating H(¸i;®) with respect to ¸i yields the desired result:
@H
@¸i
=
(1 ¡ ®¸i)dJ=d¸i ¡ ®¸¡2
i J
(1 ¡ ®¸¡1
i )2 + g(¸i) = ¡®¸¡2
i J=(1 ¡ ®¸¡1
i )2 < 0:
34The property @H=@¸i < 0 in conjunction with equation (9) imply that the left hand side of
(17) is strictly decreasing in the production cuto® quality level ¸i:
The full characterization of the solution requires the evaluation of the left-hand-side
of (17) when ¸p approaches its boundaries. Equation (9) implies that at the lower bound
of the production cuto® quality level (¸p = 1) the export cuto® quality level equals the
per-unit trade costs (¸x = ¿), whereas as ¸p approaches its upper bound (¸p ! k), ¸x
approaches in¯nity (¸x ! 1). The following conditions characterize the limiting behavior
of and H(¸p;1) and H(¸x;¿) :
lim
¸p!1
H(¸p;1) = 1; lim
¸x!¿
H(¸x;¿) = 1; (30)
lim
¸p!k
H(¸p;1) > 0; lim
¸x!1
H(¸x;¿) = 0: (31)
To prove the claims in (30), ¯rst note that J(¸i;®) =
R 1
¸i [1 ¡ ®¸¡1]g(¸)d¸: Inserting
this expression into H(¸i;®) yields
H(¸i;®) =
R 1
¸i [1 ¡ ®¸¡1]g(¸)d¸
1 ¡ ®¸¡1
i
¡ [1 ¡ G(¸i)]:
The numerator of the ¯rst term on the right hand side is always positive as long as g(¢)
is continuous at ¸i: The claims in (30) easily follow as we take the limits of both sides
as ¸p ! 1 and ¸x ! ¿: Also, note that as ¸x ! 1; the right hand side of the above
equation approaches to 0, i.e., lim¸x!1 H(¸x;¿) = 0: The ¯rst claim in (31) immediately
follows from H(k;1) = [1 ¡ G(k)](k¡1 ¡ ~ k¡1)=(1 ¡ k¡1) > 0 since k¡1 > ~ k¡1; where
~ k ´
h
1
1¡G(k)
R 1
k ¸¡1g(¸)d¸
i¡1
:
In summary, the left-hand-side of (17) is always positive and de¯nes a negatively sloped
curve starting at in¯nity as ¸p ! 1 and reaching the value H(k;1) as ¸p ! k: The right-
hand-side of (17) equals to ±fe=fp and it is independent of ¸p: Therefore, the existence of a
unique cuto® quality level ¸p > 1 is guaranteed for a su±ciently high value of ±fe=fp: For-
mally, a su±cient but hardly necessary condition for the existence of the unique equilibrium
is that H(k;1) < ±fe=fp: It is then obvious from equation (9) that the unique production
cuto® quality level ¸p determines the unique export cuto® quality level ¸x such that ¸x > ¿
35and ¸x > ¸p: Q.E.D.
E. Proof of Lemma 2
Totally di®erentiating equations (9) and (17) yields
@¸p
@n
= ¡
fx
fp
H(¸x;¿)
"
@H(¸p;1)
@¸p
+
n
¿
µ
fx¸x
fp¸p
¶2 @H(¸x;¿)
@¸x
#¡1
> 0; (32)
@¸p
@¿
= ¡
fx
fp
·
¸x
¿
@H(¸x;¿)
@¸x
+
@H(¸x;¿)
@¿
¸"
@H(¸p;1)
@¸p
+
1
¿
µ
fx¸x
fp¸p
¶2 @H(¸x;¿)
@¸x
#¡1
< 0; (33)
@¸p
@fx
= [1 ¡ G(¸x)]
"
fp
@H(¸p;1)
@¸p
+
µ
¸x
¸p
¶2 µ
f2
x
¿fp
¶
@H(¸x;¿)
@¸x
#¡1
< 0: (34)
The sign of the last bracket in each expression is negative due to Proposition 2 which also
implies that the sign of the ¯rst bracket in (33) is negative. To see this note that the ¯rst
term of that bracket can be written as
¸x
¿
@H(¸x;¿)
@¸x
= ¡
[1 ¡ G(¸x)](1 ¡ ¿~ ¸¡1
x )
¸x(1 ¡ ¿¸¡1
x )2 ;
and that the second term in the same bracket is
@H(¸x;¿)
@¿
= [1 ¡ G(¸x)]
"
¸¡1
x ¡ ~ ¸¡1
x
(1 ¡ ¿¸¡1
x )2
#
:
Adding these two expressions yields
¸x
¿
@H(¸x;¿)
@¸x
+
@H(¸x;¿)
@¿
=
[1 ¡ G(¸x)](¿ ¡ ¸x)~ ¸¡1
x
¸x(1 ¡ ¿¸¡1
x )2 < 0;
which implies that the sign of (33) is negative. Q.E.D.
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